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Nato stands firm on missiles decision

Nordwest Zeitung

...ast Bloc's propaganda offensi- ...ainst the Nato plan to station ...n Europe has had no effect on ...ernments.

...ecame clear at the Nato foreign ...s conference in Brussels. The ...s strongly reaffirmed both parts ...issiles-and-talks resolution pas- ...979.

...oreign ministers meeting was a ...ative show of unity among the ...

...st has not allowed itself to be ...

...the past few years the Soviet ...u constantly increased its con- ... superiority and its naval ... and it has heightened its nu-

...otential by installing new ...ange missiles.

... Nato countries have stood by ...tretched hand policy. They re- ...y to talk and are keen to use ...every opportunity of coopera- ...etente.

...doubt is left that if the Gene- ...alks break down Nato will go ... partly redress the balance by ... 572 Pershing 2s and Cruise ... Europe.

...ole Bonn Foreign Minister ...trich Genscher, the Brussels ...munique of the Nato Foreign ... conference was a document ...determination and openness.

...s again signalled to the new ...ader, Mr Andropov, its readi- ...lk. It is prepared to talk about ...except dispensing with missile ...tion if the Soviet Union ma- ...unter-concessions.

... position is crystal-clear. It can only forestall missile modernisation by being determined to go ahead with it if need be.

This position was first stipulated by former Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. To call it unnecessarily into question, as some members of Herr Schmidt's party, the Social Democrats, are now doing, is to harm Nato and to encourage the Russians to mark time in Geneva.

If, instead, Moscow came to terms with Nato's stand and President Reagan's call for the withdrawal of all nuclear missiles from Europe, it could make a contribution toward better understanding between the blocs.

The ball is in Moscow's court. It is up to Mr Andropov to go through the motions after talking in such cordial terms of detente.

The Nato countries, as part of their frank outlook, both internal and external, remain sceptical. The West is deeply disappointed by Soviet behaviour.

That is why mention is made in the communiqué of the oppression of the Afghan people by the Soviet Union and of Moscow's reluctance to accept a political solution that would end their suffering.

The situation in Poland is likewise greatly at odds with the Helsinki accords, of which the Soviet Union was a co-signatory.

Even the suspension of martial law in Poland is unlikely to alter the fact that the Polish people are deprived of civil rights.

So the Soviet Union has ample opportunity, not only in Geneva but also in Warsaw and Kabul, of showing by deeds and constructive proposals that it is keen on detente and disarmament.

The key to understanding is in Moscow. Mr Andropov has yet to turn it in the lock.

Bodo Schulte

(Nordwest Zeitung, 11 December 1982)



Bonn meeting

Making a point. American Secretary of State George Shultz (left) with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn. Mr Shultz was making a European tour for talks on a wide range of issues. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Uproar as American emergency plans are revealed

There was an intense reaction at the Nato foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels to a report in a British newspaper that the Americans are thinking of transferring their European command HQ from Stuttgart to London. The report, in *The Guardian*, London, was promptly denied strongly in Washington and Bonn. But later an American forces spokesman confirmed that in a war, some of the command functions would be transferred to Britain.

The intensity of the reaction showed how many sore points the *Guardian's* report raised.

For years widespread mistrust has arisen from claims that the Americans have long realised that continental Europe could not possibly be defended in a war.

The Americans are also said to be planning to limit a nuclear war to Western Europe so as to shield their own cities from a Soviet nuclear strike.

The general implication is that the United States is pulling out gradually with a view to fighting, if need be, until the last European but to saving America's own skin.

The transfer of the US headquarters in Europe would fit neatly into the picture.

The hue and cry it prompted show that the Nato foreign ministers in Brussels have painted too pretty a picture of North Atlantic realities.

Last August, when it was learnt that the Americans wanted to transfer US divisions nearer to the GDR border to demonstrate their forward strategy, Bonn was worried the Soviet Union might feel this was a provocation.

German authorities would feel it was a far too drastic step in the other direction if the Americans were now to quit their European headquarters in Stuttgart.

In today's missile age a few hundred miles one way or the other hardly matter. The optical impression is what counts.

A US withdrawal to Britain could look like the surrender of territory that America cannot hold on to.

If the deterrent is to be fully credible, thought must be devoted in time to an alternative HQ from which military leadership can continue to be provided.

That in itself is neither dramatic nor abnormal. If, however, the reports are based on a confidential Pentagon report it would be further proof of Defence Secretary Weinberger's ineptitude in dealing with his allies.

A few months ago Mr Weinberger wanted to dissuade them from selling pipeline to the Soviet Union by threatening US troop withdrawals.

The foreign ministers in Brussels demonstrated a uniform firmness and readiness to talk. What they said was aimed mainly at the new man in the Kremlin, Yuri Andropov.

Their aim was to convince him that the only way to stop Nato missile modernisation is to meet the West half-way in Geneva.

The foreign ministers feel the missile modernisation threat aspect of the December 1979 Nato missiles-and-talks resolution is still fully effective.

All that worries them is the possible strength of opposition to it by Western public opinion.

This point, the one that annoys them, could encourage the Soviet government to feel that US missile modernisation might be stymied without counter-concessions and solely by means of popular unrest in the West.

It will be less than a year before we know for sure who was right in assessing the pressure and counter-pressure.

Doubts and differences of opinion within Nato were adroitly concealed in the pleasing framework of a detailed Nato communiqué.

The North Atlantic pact is not so united as to enable one to rely implicitly on missile modernisation going ahead if the Geneva missile talks break down.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 11 December 1982)



...LD AFFAIRS

Outsiders look for signs that Bonn is maintaining stability as the keynote

The circumstances surrounding the change of government in Bonn have caused profound alarm abroad. It is not the fact that the Christian Democrats have returned to power, although that is worrying some people who are concerned about ties with the East.

The event that is causing the most concern is the general election scheduled for 6 March. Many are taking it as a sign of weakness and are wondering if it will leave no one with a clear majority.

It is causing concern because the Federal Republic of Germany has long been regarded as a model of domestic stability.

People have grown used to Bonn being one of the few reliable factors in world affairs.

Other European countries might vacillate but Germany was always reliable, predictable and consistent in its foreign policy.

There are other factors involved: the very fact that Helmut Schmidt was ousted although his government had not been defeated at the polls mystified a lot of people.

Then come the disputes within the SPD; the successes of the Greens and their allied alternative groupings at the polls; and the doings of the peace movement. All are causing concern.

"Will the Federal Republic of Germany now turn into a second Italy?" the writer was recently asked by a South American.

Such doubts take us by surprise. We must, of course, bear in mind that the general public in more distant countries learns little about German domestic affairs.

Even among people interested in political developments in Europe, knowledge is strictly limited. So misinterpretations are virtually inevitable.

The ouster of Helmut Schmidt by a Bundestag majority came as a profound shock. Foreign opinion is at a loss to understand how a Bonn Chancellor held in generally high repute could be replaced overnight, as it were, by a man whose name one first had to learn.

This fact alone created the impression that conditions in the Federal Republic were at sixes and sevens.

If the outgoing Bonn government had lost its majority at the polls people would have been surprised but would at least have understood.

But the idea of a Chancellor being ousted in mid-term by a sitting Bundestag was so unusual as to create alarm.

Three other trends have compounded matters: the disputes within the SPD, the successes of the Greens and alternative political groupings at the polls and the showing of the peace movement.

These trends are taken as a matter of course to have something to do with the change of government in Bonn.

In other continents the last TV news footage from Germany before the change of government was in many cases the major demonstrations by the peace movement.

The impression conveyed was that the Bonn government faced a powerful, irresistible mass movement.

In better-informed circles the success of the Greens, or ecologists, at the polls in a number of *Länder* has given rise to alarm.

In a number of cases people have registered the fact that political stalemate has resulted in some *Länder*. The idea of a "hung parliament" is promptly applied to Bonn.

The new government's decision to hold a mid-term poll six months after assuming power is taken to be a sign of weakness and people are wondering whether it having might not result in no one with a clear majority, as happened in Hamburg and Hesse.

This is what causes most alarm abroad.

People have grown accustomed to Bonn's stability.

This was all the more important as it seemed to ensure a high degree of political continuity in the European Community.

It has led to correspondingly serious alarm in case both Bonn and Western Europe fall into a state of stalemate and domestic uncertainty.

The specific worries vary from country to country In the United States, or at least in Washington, the big worry is that Bonn might be unable next year to carry out by the Nato resolution to station medium-range US missiles in Germany.

Elsewhere, in the southern hemisphere, people are worried that Bonn, and with it the EEC, might no longer be able to play a responsible role in international economic affairs.

This comes at a time when many countries, mainly because of pressing foreign debts, urgently need help, so it is alarming.

This may all seem, to us, wildly exaggerated. It is due for the most part to scanty information and gross misinterpretation.

But facts do not alone matter in politics. What people believe to be facts and the views they hold are equally important.

That is not to say that the change of government in Bonn should never have occurred. It was, when all is said and done, legitimate and in strict accordance with democratic rules.

Nor is it to say that a general election ought not to be held in March, much though the idea might irritate foreign opinion.

Yet these views, encountered abroad, demonstrate the responsibility we owe to the world at large.

We must not, of course, overestimate the international importance of the Federal Republic, which is a small ... in international terms.

Politicians have at times b... about the Federal Republic being ... jor trading power. This has done ... harm than good.

It is nonetheless remarkable ... much importance in other contin... placed on the domestic stabili... political reliability of Germany.

The prospect of either being fo... is seen as a serious upset, especi... view of its repercussions on Europ...

Viewed in this light, the existenc... Bonn government capable of act... of even greater importance, and co... risons with Hamburg or Hesse a... leading.

Political stalemate in Hambu... Hesse for six months or so is regr... but not a serious problem.

A corresponding stalemate in ... would be a political catastrophe, ... cially because of the deep uncer... now tension has mounted in the ... national economic system.

The Federal Republic must at a... remain capable of action beyond ... March, if only because of its Co... Market responsibilities (Bonn will ... the Council of Ministers in the ... Year).

One can but hope that voters w... preciate this need and ensure ... Bonn government is given a clear ... rity at the polls.

If the election fails to produce a ... result the major parties must appr... the responsibility they hold. Any... tion would then be better than no...

Wolfgang Wa...

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 4 Decemb...)

Shultz's quiet approach might just work

The transatlantic political climate has eased. Relations between Bonn and Washington have relaxed a little.

The dispute over steel exports to the United States has been settled. President Reagan has lifted the sanctions imposed in connection with the Siberian gas pipeline contract.

George Shultz at the State Department is not as obvious a presence as his predecessor, Mr Haig.

Mr Shultz is keen to rely on tried and trusted confidential diplomacy. The impression he conveys may be a little boring but his Quiet American approach could well prove the more effective.

Yet alienation remains. The atmosphere may have improved but views contrast starkly on matters of substance.

Secretary of State Shultz's Bonn visit, the first step on an extended European tour, failed to bridge this contrast, which is due mainly to differences in assessment of the Soviet Union's role.

While Bonn advocates an outstretched hand policy toward Moscow, Washington advises scepticism.

While Bonn is immediately prepared to receive positive signals from the East, US monitoring stations convey a less sensitive impression.

America wants to see actions in, say, Poland or Afghanistan. To use Mr Shultz's term, the United States wants to quit the signals business and wait for something more substantial.

This is the background against which recent commercial quarrels in the West must be seen.

America may have given up its resistance to the Soviet gas pipeline under construction between Siberia and Western Europe but that cannot be said to signify US approval.

Washington, US officials say time and again, is still against the scheme. But under Mr Shultz at the State Department a pragmatic view has prevailed.

What Washington now wants is something else. It wants America's allies to adopt a joint economic outlook toward the Soviet Union, an overall concept on trade with the East.

Talks have been held in the US capital with the four European gas pipeline countries (Britain, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) and with Canada, Japan and the European Community.

It has been agreed that a closer look must be taken at the problem within the West, although the project is a vague one, outlined in a non-paper, or unofficial document, and wide open to interpretation.

So, different parties to the talks have gained different impressions, and views vary widely on what and how. The aim of Mr Shultz's visit was to press ahead with the project as the United States saw it.

America would dearly like to reach firm agreement on something specific at the May 1983 Western economic summit in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Others are already balking. France, for instance, fears inroads into the sovereignty of its trading policy.

The Reagan administration needs agreement in place of the gas pipeline sanctions. At the same time Mr Shultz has adopted the East-West ideology of his lord and master.

President Reagan's views on the subject began with the simple question: "Why should we invest billions ... arms build-up against the Soviet ... when we bolster the Soviet sys... the same time by means of furth... lions in trade and credit facilities?"

Europe is naturally keen to see ... rican grain shipments to the ... Union included in the overall co... An influential European scho... thought feels the Soviet Union is b... red more by food shipments th... anything else.

It remains to be seen wheth... Shultz will return from Europe ... more than fine words and compli... The world today is no longer w... was in the 1950s.

Due to geography and the ne... come to terms in peace with its p... ful Soviet neighbour, Western E... has evolved interests of its own.

They are more complex than A... ca's. Within the Atlantic alliance ... give rise to lasting tension, tension ... which we look like having to live.

Horst Schreitter-Schwarzen...

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 Decemb...)

The German Tribun...

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HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl seeks to lose a vote and win an election

Handelsblatt

...ancellor Kohl intends to ask the ...undestag for a confidence vote. ...e wants to lose it.

...has told the Federal President, Carstens, that he wants to do this ...e an election on 6 March.

...e Constitution does not allow the ...ellor to dissolve parliament him... President Carstens is expected to ...to the proposal for a no confiden...

...ould mean that he would dissolve ...ment within 21 days, and the way ...be open for the election.

...e question now is: what can the ...ment do in the interim between ...ssolution and an election?

...aretaker government has full sco... ...ction under the Constitution, but ...er it makes full use of this scope ...olitical question that this govern... ...itself has to answer.

...Bundestag continues to exist and ...n after its dissolution — as con... ...s it all might be to the man-in... ...rd.

...e 69 of the Constitution provi... ...s the Chancellor and his cabinet ...ain in office until a new Bundes... ...assumed its duties.

...quested to by the President, the ...ellor is under obligation to stay ...ce. If the ministers are asked to ...s they must, until a new Chan... ...is appointed.

...constitution has no provisions to ...a caretaker government's scope ...on. And since the budget for fis... ...83 is likely to have already been ...d at the time of the dissolution ...vernment is under no obligation ...t spending to the previous year's ...

...e provision applies for any Ger... ...overnment — regardless whether ...caretaker one or not.

...the head of government, the Chancellor can at any time ask the president to dismiss one of his ministers.

Due to a 1976 amendment of the Constitution, the Bundestag, along with the chancellor, retains full rights until a new Bundestag assumes its function (Article 39). Since a Bundestag must hold its first meeting no more than 30 days after its election, the present parliament will be in office not only after its dissolution by the president but well beyond the elections scheduled for 6 March 1983.

The amendment was adopted with a two-thirds majority in August 1976. It came about in the wake of a dispute dating back to 1972 when Chancellor Willy Brandt lost a confidence vote and parliament was dissolved.

Then, before the amendment, the Bundestag did not continue its work. This was assumed by a "committee to safeguard the rights of the Bundestag".

The parties were unable to agree on whether or not the immunity of the MPs should be upheld after dissolution.

There was also a heated dispute over the question as to whether parliamentary state secretaries should remain in office. Here, the views of the government parties (SPD and FDP) naturally clashed with those of the opposition for campaign reasons.

After all, the parliamentary state secretaries preferred to keep their heavy official cars complete with pennants.

All these open issues were settled by the amendment. What remains unresolved is the question whether the incumbent parliament must exercise restraint until the new Bundestag meets.

Making use of all the scope available to it, the opposition SPD could, for instance, call for constant "current affairs debates" in the Bundestag or demand that pending legislation be dealt with.

In fact, some opposition MPs have already suggested such a course of action, though the top leadership of the opposition seems to be rather reluctant to go along.

Another facet is that the coalition parties could turn every Bundestag session into a campaign platform while the opposition would be unable to have its chancellorship candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, use the parliament as a forum.

For one thing, he is not an MP; for another, even as leader of the opposition in the Berlin parliament he cannot enter into a debate from the Bundesrat benches.

The Bundestag Council of Elders is trying to bring about a "moderation agreement" as soon as it becomes definitely known how the Bundestag is to be dissolved.

Hans Jörg Sottorf

(Handelsblatt, 8 December 1982)

How the government rates

Half the people questioned in an Emnid Institute poll are dissatisfied with the Kohl government and 46 per cent gave it their approval.

The institute points out that a similar survey just before the change in Bonn showed that only 26 per cent were satisfied with the Schmidt government and 73 per cent were not.

It says that this time, a major factor in the Kohl government's unpopularity are SPD voters: 85 per cent disapprove of the government despite the short time it has been in office.

Among FDP sympathisers there is a three-quarter majority in favour of the Kohl-Genscher government; 86 per cent of CDU/CSU voters approve.

The institute says much of the approval is in expectation of what might happen.

Disapproval is strongest among the Greens alternatives (92 per cent).

Simultaneous Emnid polls asked about the most "likeable political party." Here, 40 per cent voted for the CDU/CSU, 34 per cent for the SPD, 3 per cent for the FDP and 8 per cent for the Greens.

Eleven per cent said they found none likeable. Four per cent gave no opinion.

Heinz Vielain

(Welt am Sonntag, 5 December 1982)

Polls bad news for the Free Democrats

...general secretary of the Free Democrats, Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer, ...ys the party's fortunes are on the ...ain.

...ion polls disagree: they say it ...win only about 2 per cent of the ...in the Hamburg election this ...and about 3 per cent in the gene... ...tion in March.

...of course, voting decisions are ...on the day, so, despite its preca... ...position, the FDP can keep on ... But even if everything runs well ...it is not likely to come anywhere ...the 10.6 per cent of the poll it got ...

...dyed-in-the-wool FDP voters are es... ...d at a maximum of three per cent. ...berals hope to recapture another ...per cent who in 1980 voted for the ...CSU. These were essentially con... ...e voters who thought the Libe... ...d gone too far left.

...this will be as difficult a task as ...g those potential FDP voters who ...really want to leave their old ...the birch although they don't ...e breakdown of the social-liberal ...ion.

All this presupposes a campaign aimed at presenting a businesslike image to the left and the right; in other words, a janus-faced middle-of-the-road platform.

The draft election programme that is to be passed at the FDP congress in Freiburg in late January seems to be rather clever on that score.

The economic and social affairs part of the programme, dominated by Count Lambsdorff, draws a clear line between SPD and FDP while the domestic, legal and environmental aspects show some clear differences with the CDU/CSU. In part the differences are hazy and unclear.

Though the latest programme is not a political hodge-podge as some claimed of the 1980 programme, there are some areas (peace movement, Greens) where the party is trying to be accommodating. And it is here that the programme is not convincing.

Election platforms are no coalition agreements, and the FDP is right in stressing this. It is quite unthinkable that, if there is a new conservative-Liberal coalition after elections, the FDP will be able to prevail on all its campaign statements — especially in legal and environmental policy.

The Liberals are bound to clash with the CDU/CSU on such issues as the reform of the anti-terrorism legislation, protection against data abuse (especially in connection with security agencies), aliens legislation and some aspects of environmental legislation.

They are also likely to clash over parts of labour legislation such as continued pay for employees in cases of illness.

Despite efforts to stress specific issues, the campaign will be straight-forward and simple — so simple as to ultimately boil down to a plea to the electorate to give the Liberals another chance to move into parliament.

Martin E. Süskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 December 1982)

FDP question a tricky one for Chancellor

Nordwest-Zeitung

The CDU will centre its election campaign around the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. It has deliberately adopted Konrad Adenauer's view that, under the realities of the Constitution, parliamentary elections have become in fact Chancellor elections.

It is natural that in this sort of campaign, there is no room for a partner, in this case the FDP.

But this does not mean that Kohl wants the Free Democrats out of office. He wants them in. But the question is a tactical one: is it wise to keep saying so publicly?

Most of the indicators show that Kohl will remain as Chancellor. But alone or in coalition with the FDP?

If it is to be a coalition, the FDP first needs to win the five per cent of the votes necessary to get into the Bundestag. It is doubtful if, in its present condition, the FDP can pull it off.

This could change if the president does in fact dissolve the Bundestag and send the nation to the polls on 6 March. (There is still a constitutional question outstanding which leaves some doubt about whether this mid-term election can be held).

In their reports to the Bonn party meeting, Helmut Kohl and the party general secretary, Heiner Geissler, mentioned the FDP only in passing and more or less indirectly when they spoke of a "middle-of-the-road coalition."

Geissler even said that only the CDU/CSU provided an alternative to a "Red-Green alliance."

This was a pretty clear statement — in any event clearer than what was said before in interviews and public statements.

Kohl is right in more or less ignoring the FDP. There is no reason why he should publicly concern himself with Germany's Liberals.

Even if he secretly hopes that the Free Democrats will get enough votes to get into the Bundestag, there is no way he can help them to do so.

There have been those in the CDU who suggested "lending" the Free Democrats votes to help them return to the Bundestag, but these ideas have meanwhile been dropped. As one CDU man puts it: "We haven't got a single vote to give away."

In any event, the CDU/CSU have not yet won the election. It is possible that there will be a shift in the strength of the Bundestag camps that could create all sorts of problems.

If the Greens move into parliament instead of the FDP and if no party gets an absolute majority, the CDU/CSU would be faced with its greatest challenge ever.

With this possibility in mind, the conservatives are determined to fight for every vote — and they would be serving more more than just party interests: A stable government with a solid majority is a must for this country.

Karl Hugo Pruys

(Nordwest Zeitung, 7 December 1982)

EEC

Bonn opts for protectionism, membership talks, as Council of Ministers themes

Three issues will dominate when Bonn takes over the chair of the EEC Council of Ministers, in the New Year. They are:

- The attempt to curb protectionism within the EEC
- Membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal
- The growing differences of opinion with the French government on trade policy.

This has been outlined by Alois Mertes, Minister of State for European Affairs at the Bonn Foreign Office.

The harmony that was the hallmark of the Copenhagen EEC summit will soon end when it comes to carrying out the resolutions made by the Common Market heads of government.

The European Community faces a tough year both at home and in external relations.

Bonn is to take over the EEC chair in January. Will the Germans be able to give the Common Market a greater boost than the Danes were able to do over the past six months?

The answer is urgently awaited in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Chancellor Kohl may have put great importance on European policy in his government policy statement. He may also have rushed to Brussels for an executive meeting of European Christian Democrats as soon as he was elected.

But signs of unrest have accumulated. Christian Democrats at the European Parliament in Strasbourg are surprised that contacts with Bonn have been so sparing.

At the European Commission in Brussels, officials were surprised that Mertes had failed to put in an appearance.

Social Democratic Euro-MP Horst Seefeld complained that responsibilities seemed not to have been allocated in Bonn.

Some of these problems have since been solved. At a Paris conference of European Christian Democrats Helmut Kohl has sought to demonstrate his commitment to European integration at party-political level.

Herr Mertes has paid his opposite numbers in Paris and London brief visits. He is also due to visit the European Commission in Brussels.

He has ploughed through the paperwork and reached the conclusion that European integration is hard work.

The list of topics brought back by the domestic market delegation to the economic and monetary affairs committee of the European Parliament is disheartening.

It conveys an impression of everyday life in EEC Europe that is bound to put a damper on enthusiasm of any kind.

Mention is made of failure to make headway on settlement of value-added tax on imports, of slow progress on 20 specific technical guideline proposals and of stalling on industrial standardisation.

The agenda also includes further powers for the European Commission, tax allowances for travel within the Community and the issue of uniform European Community passports and driving licences.

A specifically German problem is border checks on individuals, buses and commercial vehicles.

Consolidation of the domestic market is more urgently needed than ever. US Secretary of State Shultz and other heads of department were due to visit Brussels for talks at the time of writing.

Their visit was expected to show whether there was any likelihood of a further transatlantic clash along the lines of the steel war between America and the Common Market.

Farm produce is the latest problem, with the United States fairly accusing the European Community of protectionism.

The trend toward protectionism within the Common Market, especially in the agricultural sector, is one that has long reduced the EEC to a state of paralysis.

It is, moreover, a crucial aspect of the second major issue that lies ahead: the membership negotiations with Spain and Portugal.

Bonn is extremely anxious, for political reasons, to see Spain and Portugal join the EEC. But their accession will cost money, extra cash that is not in the present Common Market kitty.

The two would-be newcomers to the EEC are largely agricultural countries, and their farm output will weigh heavily on the European Community's agricultural levy system.

The French, Greeks and Italians are anything but keen on this prospect, which is why the French are stalling and would like to see this problem solved before Spain and Portugal join the EEC as full members.

Alois Mertes is reluctant to take sides in the dispute on whether this attitude is in the Common Market's best interest.

France, he says, is keener than other EEC countries on a European identity. In doing so it seeks to reconcile European interests with its own.

Much the same is true of the thorny issue of British net contributions to the Common Market kitty, which Whitehall continues to feel are too high.

All Herr Mertes will say is that the problem is one that threatens to poison the Community.

France and Germany were expected to clash on all these issues at Copenhagen. They didn't.

President Mitterrand made with explaining to Chancellor Kohl the specific French problems that arose from, say, southward enlargement of the EEC.

There is speculation in Paris that France's intransigent Foreign Trade Minister, Michel Jobert, who made life so hard for the Bonn delegation at the Gatt talks in Geneva, may be dropped.

So the signs are that Bonn and [...] may be keen to avoid any further [...]den on Franco-German relations.

Twenty years after the signing o[f] Franco-German friendship pact by [Ge]neral de Gaulle and Chancellor [Ade]nauer both sides realise that Europ[ean] integration can only be intensified [on] the basis of agreement between [Paris] and Bonn.

Views differ as to whether rela[tions] rely on close personal ties such as [...]ed between Charles de Gaulle and [Kon]rad Adenauer or between Valéry [Gis]card d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt.

The prevailing view along Kohl's aides is that he and M. M[itter]rand, much though they may diff[er in] outlook, at least share one assessm[ent].

They take a much more level-he[aded] view of relations between Western [Eu]rope and the Soviet Union than the[ir re]spective predecessors did.

Herr Kohl never tires of laudin[g the] interest in and open-minded attitu[de to]ward German affairs shown by [the] French President.

So although the details are not [...] France and Germany share Euro[pean] interests. Might some joint effort [...] along the lines of the European Mo[ne]tary System, which was launched [by] Giscard d'Estaing and He[lmut] Schmidt?

Herr Mertes feels some such [...] might result in security policy. Th[e ...] to arrive at Franco-German coopera[tion] on security policy agreed at the la[st] round of Franco-German consulta[tions] in Bonn was meant seriously, he say[s].

Gerhard von Glin[...]

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ u[nd Welt], 10 December [1982])

Farm policies crucial for Third World

The writer, Professor Stefan Tangermann, holds the chair of agricultural economics at Göttingen University.

The European Community's agricultural trading policy threatens to impose a serious burden on the EEC's external relations.

The background against which the clash must be seen is that the Common Market has emerged as a major agricultural exporter.

Yet powerful forces in the EEC are keen to deliberately restrict farm imports and to boost exports for all they are worth.

This, viewed internationally, is a most alarming trend.

The European Community prides itself, in development and trade policy, on having made the developing countries numerous trading concessions.

But on closer scrutiny its policy on agricultural produce will be seen to be extremely problematic. In this sector it has merely set about redistribution within the Thord World.

The left hand, EEC agricultural policy, has paid little attention to what the right hand, development policy, has been doing.

The Common Market has not cut back its domestic output of the produce for which preferential treatment was given. It has continued to boost home output with a will.

As a result, developing countries that were not granted preferential status have been displaced from EEC markets. Even worse, they have been subjected to fierce competition from EEC exports subsidised to the hilt. This is particularly true of sugar and beef.

The European Community has thus introduced a strong element of discrimination into its economic relations with the Third World.

Developing countries that are parties to the Lomé Convention and have close political ties with the EEC are given preference while other developing countries are put to even greater disadvantage.

In the long run this cannot be to the benefit of the European Community's relations with the Third World.

The development of a liberal international economic order is bound to suffer as a result.

In particular, the EEC hampers what many developing countries, given growing protectionist trends in the industrialised world, feel might be the answer: more trade among themselves.

By means of exports subsidised to the hilt the European Community is barging into markets the developing countries hoped to work themselves.

Despite the growth in overall Third World self-assurance individual developing countries still have difficulty in prevailing with their own special economic interests over the powerful industrialised world.

Thailand yielding to the EEC on tapioca was a case in point. Industrialised countries can exert much more powerful pressure, as the EEC has found out to its cost in ties with the United States.

In farm trade policy the European Community used to be pampered by the USA. The 1962 chicken war was very much an exception to the rule.

There are various reasons why this has been the case. US agricultural policy is naturally not free of protec[tionist] tendencies.

The waiver by which the United [Sta]tes retained privileges under the [Gatt] treaty is but one instance of ma[ny in] this context.

The crucial factor in ties with [the] EEC, however, seems to have bee[n that] the United States did not want to [ham]per European integration by inord[inate] economic pressure.

European integration was clea[rly in] the US foreign policy interest. B[ut] EEC farm tariff barriers were no[t in]itially aimed at imports from the U[nited] States in particular.

Initially the Common Market w[as not] significant as a competitor in exp[orting] farm produce to world markets. B[ut] any more.

Politically, America and Europ[e have] drifted further apart than at any [time] since the Second World War. Eco[nomi]cally the United States is al[so] against it, especially US agricultur[e].

It is breathtaking at times to se[e how] nonchalantly EEC agricultural [policy]makers play with fire.

They think aloud about ham[pering] the import or consumption of [...] substitutes and soya products fro[m the] United States.

Yet at the same time they su[bsidise] farm exports to non-EEC countr[ies so] heavily that US exporters are [hard] pressed by the competition.

Do EEC policymakers realise [how] seriously the United States means [it] time when it objects? Is the Eu[ropean] Community really prepared to [risk a] full-scale trade war?

Neither side must allow ma[tters to] come to a head. Agricultural tra[de, im]portant though it may seem [to] policymakers, is not so crucial [...] worth running the risk of a furth[er ...]

Continued on page 8

UNEMPLOYMENT

Two fundamentally opposing schools of thought

DIE ZEIT

[Une]mployment is likely to be over [2.]3 million when the figures are [publish]ed on March 3 next year, just [da]ys before the general election.

[At] the same time, the Bonn go[vernmen]t will probably realise that this [is] to be the average annual figure [...], in other words, 150,000 more [than the] official government projection.

[This] figure would coincide with the [an]nual report of the Council of [Econom]ic Advisers that assumed an annual unemployment of 2.35 [million, al]though saying that a more unfa[vourable] figure was quite possible. In [fac]t, the Bonn Economic Affairs [Ministry] has for some time been more [pessimist]ic on that score than the rest of [...].

[This] development is likely to add a [new ed]ge to the discussion on ways [and mean]s of fighting unemployment.

[For] now it seems as if nothing [can be] done any more. All avenues [seem to] have been explored and job[-creation] policies have gone as far as [they can] go in Bonn's tight financial [...].

[The La]bour Office this year has spent [...]. This should rise to about [... n]ext year if unemployment [is as] predicted. But the Labour Of[fice ha]s to make ends meet with [...] as a result of cutbacks in [...].

[Now that] the actual election campaign [has] begun, it is quite obvious [that the do]minant theme will be unem[ployment]. Two fundamental views are [...]dish:

[One c]amp is prepared to accept [unemploym]ent as an unalterable fact — [at least in] the medium term. It argues [that, even] when industry is working [to ca]pacity, business is unlikely to [invest mon]ey in expansion that will [create] jobs.

[So th]ere work is must be redis[tributed. T]he way out, argument runs, is [to cut w]orking hours and introduce [job sh]aring. Among the advocates [are] the Protestant Church, the [unions] and many SPD politicians.

[The other c]amp is not convinced that [the st]ill growing unemployment [is] an unalterable fact. As a re[sult, it op]pose shorter working hours, [...] — should there be a new [upswing] — it would prove almost im[possible to r]everse such measures; and [if they cou]ld be reversed it would prove [costly for bo]th the state and industry.

[The way o]ut, as they see it, is to pro[vide ince]ntives for private inves[tment in the hope] that investment by itself [will reduce] the unemployment [...].

[Off]icially the line of argu[ment is held] by Bonn's new coalition [...]. But there, too, views are di[vided. Labour] Minister Norbert Blüm, [for instance, would] like to bring about a ca[binet decision] as early as next January [that would resul]t in a bill for the reduc[tion of work]ing hours. It will be inte[resting to see] how the majority of the [coalition vie]w Blüm's motion. Most of them do not seem to think much of the idea.

Earlier retirement, as envisaged by the Labour Ministry, would be modelled on a similar approach in the food and catering industry by the head of the catering workers' union, Günter Döding.

The Döding Plan, whereby the low social security pensions of older workers who retire prematurely are supplemented by the employers, has the advantage of being reversible. To make up for this added financial burden on the employers, the younger workers have agreed to moderate their wage demands — in theory anyway.

This would provide a certain amount of relief on the job market, but the benefits would be relatively small for three reasons:

First, there is every likelihood that wage-related operating costs would rise. This is due to the fact that the remaining work force is unlikely to agree to wage cutbacks, as proposed by the Catholic sociologist Oswald von Nell-Breuning who said that it should be taken for granted that if working hours are shortened wages would also have to be pared down.

Second, not every post that has been vacated as a result of early retirement can be filled by a younger person.

Even the politically fairly left-wing Berlin economist Hans-Jürgen Krupp doubts that shorter working times would provide much relief on the job market. According to pessimistic estimates, the relief would amount to only 20 per cent of the theoretically possible.

Third, the beneficial effects of shorter working hours would be the smaller the more difficult it proves to find suitable people among the jobless to fill the cancies.

Though more and more skilled workers become available as unemployment grows, the duration of unemployment is also growing, and this means that workers fall behind on the skills they once possessed.

As a result, further training and retraining programmes for the jobless should be intensified. But this would cost the state and the taxpayer more. In fact, cash has forced the state to cut back on existing programmes.

The objections to early retirement apply even more to shorter work weeks.

Part-time work might be better. According to Mannheim economist Eduard Gaugler, some 60 per cent of today's full-time jobs could be split.

But whether or not this will happen will depend on the cost of splitting jobs and the willingness of the employee to give up some of his work and pay. Those who have to look after a family are not very likely to agree to it.

The same applies to job sharing where one particular job is shared by two or more people.

Granted, a television cameraman whose wife also wields a TV camera might decide to share the job with her. A couple, both of whom are pastors, might also decide to take turns looking after their flock. So might couples both of whom are doctors. Mother and daughter could also decide to share the same factory job. Only a small percentage of the working population would seriously consider part-time work and job sharing. Yet even these few per cent could provide some relief on the job market.


As important as shorter working times in the current political discussion are programmes aimed at providing the unemployed with better skills and measures that would improve the placement of "difficult cases".

Conservatives reject the present job creating policies, arguing that they achieve the opposite of the desired effect: worse instead of better growth conditions and less rather than more flexibility at work.

They — like Rüdiger Soltwedel of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy — call for "fewer job creating policies."

Soltwedel's appeal is based on the ex-

Continued on page 7



The jobless hold their first national conference

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Germany's first congress of the nation's unemployed has been held in Frankfurt. The 1,500 delegates from all parts of the country did not issue a communique. They decided instead to publish a report later.

Even though the delegates from 256 union, church and other action groups for the unemployed were unable to agree on a national organisation, they decided to appeal to the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) to accept the unemployed as members of individual unions. It was also decided to hold a major demonstration in Bonn next year.

The decision not to form a special unemployed union was as a surprise to observers — especially since the first two days of the congress seemed to indicate that a motion by a Berlin group to form such a union would be adopted.

After hours of discussion the 500 participants in one work group agreed, however, that it would be more effective to call on the DGB to accept unemployed people as members and permit them to take part in its decision-making processes.

So far, only teachers', sales staff, banking and insurance unions have been known to accept the unemployed as members. The DGB sent observers to Frankfurt.

Young people without work
Unemployment among the under 20s
Jan–July 1982
1981
1979 1980

Discussions in the 14 work groups at the congress disclosed both differences of opinion and a common platform. The final decision was that jobless action groups and other initiatives should cooperate more closely next year and launch joint moves.

The fact that the unemployment figure announced at the beginning of December topped the two million mark lent the Frankfurt meeting an air of particular timeliness.

The various work groups were not only concerned with organisational matters and practical self-help but also with social and psychological problems.

The jobless conceded that they also wanted to gather new courage. They said they were sick and tired of being maligned as malingerers and of being pushed around from one government office to another. "We're taking matters into our own hands now," they announced.

The initiative and self-help groups want to help the legions of unemployed find a way out of their isolation and close ranks against accusations of malingering.

After some sharp criticism levelled against rationalisation measures and cutbacks, which they dubbed the "greatest destroyers of jobs," they said it was time to "light the fuse of the social dynamite of unemployment." The motto for the months to come is "we shall defend ourselves."

Spokesman Frank Pharao said he was satisfied with the congress despite the fact that there was no closing declaration.

"What matters is that the action groups of the unemployed have been strengthened in their field work and that there will be a much closer cooperation between the various initiatives in terms of welfare for fellow-jobless and future action."

He stressed that the jobless initiatives did not want to dissolve themselves within the trade unions but that they only wanted to cooperate with them.

Said Pharao: "The learning process in the DGB has already begun. The unions will step up their discussion of the unemployment problem."

Albert Bechtold

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 6 December 1982)



The Big Five hold secret meeting to try and stave off major breakdown

The finance ministers and central bank presidents of the five most important industrial nations (USA, Britain, France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany) met in Kronberg near Frankfurt this month.

They did not face the press and no communiqué was issued. Why did they hold such a mysterious meeting?

Because several developing and East Bloc countries are no longer able to service their foreign debt on schedule. Their insolvency is not only a financial problem; it could also damage world trade.

A country that is unable to raise a loan cannot import. And since Mexico became a problem virtually overnight, when it found itself unable to repay interest and principal on its foreign debt, the unthinkable has become thinkable: a chain reaction that could lead to a major breakdown.

Politicians have long seen themselves on the edge of an abyss. At the Versailles Summit in June 1982, the governments of the seven major industrial nations tried to find a cure.

But because of many previous unfulfilled summit promises few people believed that they actually intended to deliver.

At that time, the main industrial nations said that they would strengthen the position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The five nations whose currencies make up the basket on which the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) — a kind of artificial international currency — are based are the same that met in Kronberg. The intention was to help the IMF control the economic policies of its member nations, thus making for a bit of collective responsibility in the world's economy.

But what use is it if the five big ones cooperate while the IMF is short of money? Therefore the Kronberg meeting also dealt with ways and means of speeding up the IMF's supply of funds beyond the usual procedure.

Developments in the Third World are worrying: two oil price explosions created a dangerous international mixture of recession, declining commodity prices, high interest rates and too ambitious development programmes that were out of keeping with long-term financing possibilities.

But commercial banks — acting like lemmings — kept financing these programmes, thus helping to build up mountains of debt. As Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl put it: "At times, the banks were more concerned with expansion than with security and profitability."

Governments, banks, the World Bank and the IMF were brought up short at the last annual meeting of the IMF in Toronto when it turned out that Mexico was far from being the only insolvent country.

Ever since, policy makers have been pondering ways and means of preventing the collapse of the world finance system. The key phrase they came up with was "cooperation by all parties concerned" with the IMF playing a pivotal role.

As an initial measure, the Mexican government was granted bridging facili-



ties by American government authorities and a number of central banks via the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.

Short-term credits helped Mexico weather the rough patch before concluding a stabilisation agreement with the IMF.

The banks agreed to freeze their claims for the moment and the IMF has meanwhile agreed to grant an emergency credit of close to $4bn. Brazil applied for $5bn; and Argentina is in the process of negotiating $2bn.

Through the Bank for International Settlements, Hungary was granted a bridging loan until the conclusion of negotiations for an IMF credit.

Many of the nations now writhing under their foreign debt will soon be queuing up at the IMF credit desk.

The IMF is anxious to help them restore their creditworthiness. But is it equipped to?

The idea behind the IMF is to make life easier for its members. It helps out with short and medium-term loans, repayable after seven years at the latest. The loans depend on current account imbalances that cannot be settled in the short term. The IMF itself receives the funds through its member nations. These contributions in turn depend on the volume of trade, the GNP and similar data.

Member nations can borrow up to one-quarter of their own quota with no strings attached.

As a result, most of the debtors owe it no more than 25 per cent of their own quota.

The more a country goes beyond this 25 per cent, using credit facilities of up to 100 per cent of its quota, the tougher the terms imposed on the borrowing nation.

IMF's ability to impose conditions that will force its debtors to introduce remedial action for previous economic policy mistakes is the basis on which the hope to prevent a collapse of the world's financial system despite mountainous debts now rests.

All IMF member nations agree that the Fund's own means of $67bn are inadequate. But they are far from agreed on the amount by which this liquidity is to be boosted.

Most European Community countries would like to raise the quotas by 50 per cent to total about $90bn to $100bn.

The developing countries would like to have this increased to $120bn. They would also like to see the IMF do away with all strings it now attaches to loans, turning it into a self-service institution.

The USA has so far not been prepared to boost the quotas by more than 40 per cent. Bonn — as usual at international meetings — is proceeding gingerly. It is said that Bonn would like to see the total raised to $100bn but that it would also go along with $85bn, wedged as it is between the USA and the EEC.

Generally, the goal is to make America agree to a 50 per cent increase.

The quotas themselves say little about the IMF's actual ability to effectively help countries that suffer from persistent foreign trade and current account imbalances.

Not all currencies are equally suitable for credits. The Indian rupee, for instance, is far less suitable than the US dollar, the deutschemark, the yen and the Swiss franc.

Despite seven quota increases (the eighth was negotiated in Kronberg to the point where it is likely to be finalised by next April) and despite credit agreements with Saudi Arabia and some industrial countries, the Fund's available means are limited — especially compared with demand.

In the first quarter of 1982, the IMF had $36bn available to it in suitable currencies. This was made up of the contributions of seven industrial, eight oil-exporting and 15 developing countries. In addition, there was the $21bn available to the IMF in the form of SDRs (which only central banks accept).

As a result it had available to it some $57bn in suitable currencies.

Of this amount, $16bn is out on loan, $ 15bn has been committed in the form of credits that have not yet been taken up,



Donald Regan, the American Treasury Secretary (left), with Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the Kronberg finance meeting. (Photo: dpa)

The International Monetary Fund

1 The fund has 146 members: industrial countries and 126 de... loping nations, of whom 12 are ... exporters.

2 Credits are financed by me... payments. It has a total ... $67bn either available or comm... Available funds have been boo... in the past few years by special fa... lities financed by direct credits gr... ted by national monetary authori... In addition, there are the gen... credit agreements with 10 of ... most important industrial nati... and Switzerland. Under the term... the agreements, the fund can... granted credits of up to $7bn. It ... also resort to money markets.

3 The fund's top executive body ... the board of governors. The mana... ment is in the hands of an executi... board, and the main policy mak... body is the interim committee of ... members.

making for $31bn in committed f... one way or another.

The remaining $26bn would be ... up very soon if only some of the co... tries with major foreign debts app... for IMF loans.

The IMF liquidity would also be ... sufficient if only a few of the more t... 70 developing countries that now ... IMF loans wanted to increase these ... dits.

Whether or not the IMF will be ... to play a greater role in the financi... current account deficits of the dev... ing countries depends on two thing...

- Hard currency member na... would have to provide more m... and;
- The debtor nations would have ... prepared to accept unpopular terms ... garding their economic policies.

The first of these will be hard to ... plement because quota increases ... be ratified by the individual pa... ments, and this can take years.

So far, only Bonn has taken a p... tive attitude towards America's pro... sal to create a special emergency f... that would be re-financed as needed ... the ten most important industrial ... tions plus Switzerland to the tun... $10bn to $15bn.

Among the topics of discussion ... Kronberg was also the question ... whether the special fund should ... made part of the general credit ag... ments of the ten industrial coun... and Switzerland that provide the ... with credits of up to $7bn under spe... fic conditions.

This would mean that the IMF wo... have another $17bn to $22bn availa... to it. Credits given under the general cre... agreements may, however, only ... granted to the participating 11 count... while those from the special f... would be made available to deb... countries outside that group — tho... only under special conditions.

The second prerequisite for a stre... thening of the IMF's role is easier ... meet. After all, once they find the... selves in dire straits, governments ... more likely to accept the IMF's to... conditions for loans.

This was not so in the past. In ... and 1981, it lent a net $5.6bn to non ... producing developing countries, co... pared with commercial bank loans ... $85bn during the same period.

In the past, the IMF and commer...

Continued on page 8

Dying steel city looks for a future to forge

...er Nachrichten

...s once were between 8,000 and ...00 workers in the steelworks of ... city of Neunkirchen. Now all ...left of the industry are two steel ...plants employing 2,000.

...kirchen (pop: 51,000) is the sec...gest city in the Saar, after Saar...n. The whole state is paying the ...of depending on two industries, ...d steel.

...problem is that coal and steel ...the Saar. The rulers of the two ...ies decide what other industries ...be allowed to move in.

...kirchen is the home town of the ...German party leader, Erich Ho..., and the East German papers re...tensively on its plight.

...began to fall in the mid 1960s ...d 10 years later as prices plum... and Japan dumped cheap steel ...market.

...next few months will be crucial ...e Saar. Its future is largely in the ...of steel company management, ...de unions, the state government ...federal government in Bonn.

...re once was a saying in Neunkir...: "joining the mill means a job ...". It is a quote fondly used by ...lists from foreign countries writ...bout the dying city.

...slow death began in 1975. The ...us year had been a good year for ...and in 1975 a new, non-polluting ... was completed. The traditional ...-brown cloud over the city dis...ed and in its place appeared a ...nocuous white cloud.

...soon people began to realise that ...e DM120m plant was a waste of .... They wanted their old smoky ...back.

...ngs just keep on getting worse and ...al trouble began in 1977/78; the ...s clean, but there were storm ...on the horizon.

...n the family that had led the steel ...ry to prosperity suddenly decided ...out of the business.

...Hamburg oil company bought ...of the equity, but the work force ...that the end was near. A Luxembourg company, Arbed, whose steel production had for years been helping to depress the nearby Neunkirchen works, stepped in and bought the plants at both Neunkirchen and at Röchling-Burbach.

But the world-wide crisis meant that there was no relief. Japan was dumping cheap steel and all the traditional steel-producing nations were paying the price.

The steel magnates of the Saar have been taking their time looking for a way to solve the problem. They began looking in 1977 but have found no solution.

The Saar has been living with uncertainty for five years but there have been nothing more than a few orderly demonstrations and protest rallies.

The main reason for the placid response is that 55-year-olds are able to retire on good pensions. Others hope that subsidies from Bonn will save their jobs.

Still others have been pinning their hopes on working elsewhere: if they could work 30km away at another steelworks at Völklingen, it would mean more travel, but not unemployment.

Some have got jobs there already, but they are still gloomy about the future because it is a more obsolete plant than Neunkirchen's, and is being kept going only through heavy doses of government money.

Bonn has been pumping millions into the Saar, and the state government knows that it would forfeit its reason for existence if the Arbed-Saar steelworks folded.

Bonn and the Saarland government have already risked and done a great deal, but the Saar man-in-the-street believes that many of the millions pumped in will benefit the Luxembourg steel industry more than the Saar's.

In the mid-1950s when the Saar became German again there were many people who wanted it to become a sort of model state for Europe. They did not want to be German but independent. This was rejected by the majority of voters.

History is full of ironies. The decline of the Saar steel industry has now made the state economically largely dependent on a foreign country after all — Luxembourg.

The next few weeks and months will show the extent of this dependence and whether, as rumour has it, the steel crisis will lead to a disintegration of the Saar.

So what is to be done? Bonn Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber has been unable so far to commit himself to shifting Germany's only coal liquefaction plant to Neunkirchen.

Steel in a crisis
German production and consumption

The people of Neunkirchen would be happy to accept even such a risky project. But they are also prepared to accept social change and permit the city to become an efficient centre of service industries.

The city council is now looking for new industries. Right now, all that the 51,000 people of Neunkirchen (and the 200,000 others in the vicinity) know is that they want to survive. So does the Saar as a whole.

If the Arbed steel works fold, some 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the steel industry and related industries would be lost.

Says one politician: "If that happens, we can auction off the Saar to the highest bidder."

Gerd Meiser

(Kieler Nachrichten, 8 December 1982)

Continued from page 5

perience gained in countries that spent a lot of money on such policies, achieving very little (Sweden): and in countries that spent relatively little but imposed heavy restrictions on individuals, forcing them to adapt to worsening economic conditions, managing to keep the jobless rate down (Austria).

The opposing camp, represented among others by the Federal Labour Office, demands that more money be spent. These people fear that there will be a loss of flexibility on the labour market because of declining funds for further training, retraining and other specialised programmes for certain groups of jobless.

There is a kernel of truth in both arguments. Many job creating measures are an open invitation to abuse them and go over board in laying claim to public funds.

Economic Affairs Ministry experts in Bonn are convinced that legislation cannot prevent the abuse of social benefits in one form or another.

They say that the hope that sweeping job creating measures could actually bring about self-sustaining and profitable jobs is unfounded. The state, they say, could save a lot of money without facing charges of having neglected its duty.

On the other hand, many of these drives and programmes are a must. It is, for instance, absolutely necessary to provide training and retraining programmes for the growing mass of jobless who either lack skills or have the wrong ones.

Even if job creating measures might not result in new jobs, they are necessary for social reasons. Handicapped jobless could hardly be placed without them. Moreover, these measures could also create certain public sector jobs that an unemployed person would have to accept when offered it.

It is obvious that making it compulsory for the jobless to train or retrain and to accept public sector work would reduce the abuse of public funds.

Making it more difficult to abuse benefits and paring down some of these benefits could ease the financial position of the Labour Office. But it would not really remedy our unemployment woes.

It is up to the government's economic and fiscal policy and to the parties to collective bargaining (who still do not understand the link between unemployment and wages) to create new jobs.

For the time being, job creating policies are growing ever more expensive — and this won't change after the 6 March national elections.

Dieter Piel

(Die Zeit, 3 December 1982)





...ECTIVE

Signs that peace movement is beginning to lose its sense of direction

The German peace movement appears to have lost some of its direction: it has grown too complicated. It may not be split, but it is sometimes confusingly organised.

The number of member groups has grown too large to count, and even the respective leader no longer all maintain contact with one another.

People get confused when events organised by different parts of the movement clash. The clashes are not always unintentional.

It is now three years since the Brussels Nato summit decided on its missile modernisation programme for Europe, the event that gave the peace movement its major push.

In a year the need to go ahead with modernisation will be looked at again in the light of how much progress has been made at the Geneva missiles talks.

But the leaders of the peace movement do not give the impression of having any idea how to influence the missiles-and-talks issue.

It seems that they do not know how they will prevent or delay modernisation if the go-ahead is given.

And they have no idea how they might believably claim some credit if any progress is made at Geneva.

Moves agreed by the peace movement lately, at two conferences in Frankfurt, for instance, are unlikely to be of any lasting effect.

Petitions against missile modernisation have been launched (and in some cases are still in circulation) by the Krefeld Appeal group, by the trade unions and by groups in Bielefeld, Starnberg, Datteln and so on.

At a rough estimate they have been signed by about 10 per cent of the adult population of the Federal Republic of Germany.

These four million signatures or so have been fairly ineffective because representative democracy does not need to pay any attention to what is claimed to be basis democracy.

Individual petitions are not bound to be successful merely by virtue of having been submitted to parliament or the government.

This point has been made to the supporters of the trade union appeal. It will be clear to the Krefeld group, led by Petra Kelly and Josef Weber; they have no intention of even submitting their lists of signatures to the Bonn Chancellor. Yet further appeals to sign the Krefeld Appeal were endorsed by the German Peace Society, affiliated to War Resisters International, and by the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation.

They were made at the Frankfurt annual conference of the former, the DFG/VK, and a Frankfurt working session of the latter, the Kofaz.

Dr Helmut Simon, a Karlsruhe Constitutional Court judge, had a suggestion to make at a conference to prepare for the Protestant Church assembly.

Given this pointless competition for signatures he wondered whether a "consultative referendum" might not be held as a kind of plebiscite to put much-vaunted public opinion to parliament or the government.

It would not, as he envisaged it, be in any way binding on the government.

Constitutionally, the referendum idea is extremely dubious. It would be an expensive exercise. The value of the outcome would be doubtful too.

The only question that could be put would be whether the public was for or against stationing new medium-range missiles in Germany.

The peace movement would be most embarrassed if a majority were to insist on missile modernisation even though the government no longer felt it was necessary.

Yet any question that might arise in connection with the democratic legitimation of a decision by the government, which is responsible to parliament, to go ahead with missile modernisation has already been answered in constitutional terms.

Chancellor Kohl's intention is to hold an early general election to gain a clear electoral mandate in favour of the Nato resolution.

One reason why he plans to go to the people is to decide whether there is to be a Bundestag majority in favour of the resolution without ifs and buts or a majority that takes a more ambivalent approach.

The early general election, unlike the next regular deadline in autumn 1984, would be held well in advance of the decision to go ahead with missile modernisation, should it need to be taken.

A general election in March 1983 would not, unlike a deadline in autumn 1982, be overburdened by urgently needed economic policy decisions.

In opting for an early poll, Helmut Kohl has taken much of the wind out of the sails of the peace movement.

Kofaz was first to adapt to the new situation. It called on the movement to use the election campaign to mobilise opinion against a further arms build-up.

Preventing the stationing of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in Germany, it said, was a matter of survival, jobs and social rights.

The DFG/VK decided to lay down guidelines by which the election manifestos of political parties were to be judged.

So nothing will come of appeals by Social Democratic foreign policy specialist Karsten D. Voigt not to wage an election campaign on the missiles issue.

The peace movement, like Chancellor Kohl, seems determined to get voters to commit themselves on the subject.

All leading organisations in the movement, including Kofaz, the DFG/VK, the *Aktion Sühnezeichen*, the national coordinating bodies of protest movements and political parties such as the Greens, plan to back the campaign to get local authorities to declare their areas nuclear-free zones.

Maybe they have chosen to because they lack confidence in their ability to win the day. Maybe it is because they feel most at home and most confident of success at local level.

Nuclear-free zone campaigns, which are often backed by the local SPD, are unperturbed by the point made by the Interior Ministers of North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse.

The Ministers have pointed out that local authorities have no authori[ty to] declare themselves nuclear-free zo[nes].

But the campaigns are going a[head] regardless because their organisers [feel] they will reach the public and ca[n win] support.

They are a means of approac[hing] people one knows personally, p[eople] who are well-disposed toward the c[am]paigner.

This seemed to be the idea behind "peace weeks" held in November l[ast]ly, or so it seemed, by church orga[nisa]tions in their local parishes.

A spokesman for the German Pr[otes]tant Church has claimed that about [...] the country's parishes, or between 5[...] and 6,000, held peace week meeting[s].

Aktion Sühnezeichen, a church o[rga]nisation, plans to evaluate the outc[ome] in the months ahead. It seems sur[e to] conclude that the peace movement [is in] a generally poor state.

Confusion is the word for ideas [on] "direct non-violent action" called [for] alongside other kinds of boycott, at [the] DFG/VK annual conference.

The term is generally used to desc[ribe] activities that verge on duress brou[ght] to bear on organs of state.

A wide range of such plans was d[is]cussed at the Frankfurt gathering [of] "autonomous" peace groups.

The two-week "blockade" of the a[nu]clear weapons depot at Grossengst[in]gen last summer is considered a mo[del] even though its success is disputed [wi]thin the peace movement.

Activities are planned in the we[eks] ahead at Nördlich air base, near Co[lo]gne, at a nuclear weapons depot n[ear] Hamburg, near the US Rhine-Main [air] base, Frankfurt, and at Grossengsti[ngen] again.

Protest groups will tour bunkers [and] subway stations that are claimed t[o be] suitable as fallout shelters.

Such moves amount to more than [dis]cussions and street theatre, as their [or]ganisers readily admit.

"For people who have hitherto d[one] no more than take part in demonst[ra]tions and publicity work," it was p[oin]ted out in one paper, "taking part in [ci]vil disobedience campaigns near [nu]clear facilities is undeniably a m[ajor] move."

Reports by those who have taken p[art] in such activities show that scuffles [of]ten occur, although the authorities [are] said to be to blame.

"We are far from free of anxiety," [the] paper continued, "when we bear [in] mind that such activities represe[nt a] modest encroachment on the cons[titutional] availability of and access to nuc[lear] weapons demanded by Nato mili[tary] men.

"The brasshats are thus challenge[d to] respond directly."

Over the past two years there [have] been meetings in Bonn, Easter march[es], music festivals, peace weeks and co[un]tless events sponsored by hundreds [of] thousands of supporters of the pe[ace] movement.

Since all this activity has failed to [ac]complish anything whatever there i[s a] hollow ring to the following cla[im]: "Extra-parliamentary resistance [...] emerges as the only, the crucial me[ans] of bringing about a situation in the [Fe]deral Republic of Germany in 1983 [in] which the stationing of medium-ra[nge] missiles is made politically impossib[le]."

A more realistic claim was made b[y a] member of the movement from We[st...] who said that local leaders of the p[eace] movement behaved like an el[...] "Everyone does what he wants."

Georg Hef[...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Ze[itung] für Deutschland, 4 December [1982])

Continued from page 4

den on strained political ties between Europe and America.

The European Commission has suggested gradually harmonising EEC and US grain prices. That would be most convenient for the United States.

Might America not be prepared in return to agree to self-restraint in exports of grain substitutes provided Europe kept to a grain price timetable?

The Americans feel a unilateral measure of self-restraint in maize gluten exports is out of the question.

EEC policymakers feel US grain prices would be virtually inconceivable in Europe without compensation of some kind.

Viewed singly, neither idea stands much chance of political approval. In combination they might well be feasible.

Agricultural trading policy on both sides of the Atlantic would then be pursued not against each other but in harmony.

Common Agricultural Policy, once the motive force of European integration, has come to be a burden on domestic relations in the European Community.

We must not allow it to wreak havoc on external relations too.

Stefan Tangermann

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 December 1982)

Emergency finance meeting

Continued from page 6

banks operated in different markets. The IMF borrowers were countries whose access to international money markets was barred because they had wrecked their credit rating. They therefore had no choice but to put up with the IMF's tough terms.

The banks made their credit deals in countries that were not yet at the point where they had to accept the IMF's rescue programmes.

The IMF will continue to play a quantitatively limited and qualitatively important role in the field of international finance.

Even if the IMF's liquidity is boosted (which would also boost international liquidity and hence inflation), the quality of its credit would still remain more important than the quantity.

IMF's stringent economic guarantees that its debtors will tighten their economies.

IMF invariably insists that anti-inflationary measures be introduced and this, in turn, improves the borrower's ability to repay the debt.

As a result, it would make sense if commercial banks and the IMF cooperated closely. A country that has accepted the IMF's rescue programme for its economy would also have something akin to a seal of approval with which to obtain additional credit from commercial banks. Without this, the lender's money would go into a bottomless pit.

Rudolf Herlt

(Die Zeit, 10 December 1982)

[TR]ANSPORT

New Mercedes aimed at smaller-car market

[...]0 years, people wanting to buy [Merc]edes have had to go on a wait[ing list].

[Daiml]er-Benz have been able to [...] production while other motor [manufact]urers considered themselves [lucky if s]ales kept steady.

[There] seemed hardly any need for [Daimler]-Benz to introduce its new mo[del, the 1]90. Their range of cars without [this m]odel is clearly ideal.

[But the] Stuttgart manufacturers went [ahead w]ith plans for a new model, the [190, to] cater for the middle market.

[They d]ecided to go ahead after the oil [cris]is at the end of 1973," says [Daimler]-Benz board chairman Gerhard [Prinz].

[We w]ere definitely going to manu[facture] Mercedes with lower fuel con[sumption] to meet demand after a heavy [...]ing increase in petrol [prices].

[Daiml]er-Benz were not, he says, [moved b]y imminent consumer regula[tions in t]he United States.

[The] Mercedes sold in North Ameri[ca are] diesel models, so US regula[tions wou]ld not have affected Daimler[-Benz] one way or the other.

[But de]velopments in the United Sta[tes confir]med us the direction the trend [was tak]ing," he admits.

[Fuel] prices have since grown even [more exp]ensive, but not as much as had [been fe]ared, and fuel consumption has [been red]uced perceptibly in the existing [Mercede]s range.

[So] the decision to go ahead with [the 190 w]as premature when viewed in re[trospect]. Herr Prinz is convinced it was [right. Ec]onomy is generally rated higher [by car b]uyers nowadays, regardless of [prices] at any given time. This eco[nomy-]consciousness is not going to [change], so we have to bear it in [mind].

[Work] for the W201, as the 190 has [been k]nown at Daimler-Benz since [...], have been changed from time to [time].

[It was] originally planned to manufac[ture on]ly about 60,000 Mercedes com[pacts a] year," the chief executive says, ["now] we aim to sell to a new cate[gory of c]ustomer."

[This] year 100,000 Mercedes 190s are [to roll o]ff the Stuttgart assembly lines, [and the] output is eventually to total [...].


[The ne]w customers are to be moto[rists wh]o in the past have not wanted a [Merced]es not because it was too expen[sive but] because it was too big for [them].

[...] does not feel the price, at least [...]00, is too high. Daimler-Benz [ex]pect to gain customers among [those] who have previously bought [...].

[Herr] Prinz studiously avoids any [mention] of this possibility, however. [B]MWs with which he hopes to [...] merely show "what potential [...] this end of the range."

[...] obviously agree. They unveiled [...] models a few days before the [...], 190 was premiered and plan [to manu]facture 1,200 a day, as against [...] previous models.

[...]edes are not just going to win [cust]omers with the new model how[ever. O]wners of larger Mercedes will now be considering whether the smaller model might not serve them equally well.



Herr Prinz is not prepared to forecast the extent to which this might be the case. All he will say is that Daimler-Benz are prepared to be extremely flexible in the output of their various models.

In the medium term he is confident that overall sales of Mercedes will increase, by virtue of the new 190, from 450,000 to 550,000 a year.

The 190 is also designed to promote the Mercedes image. It will demonstrate that Mercedes are not just de luxe models, expensive and behind the times.

Even at a time when the price of petrol is steadily increasing the Mercedes, it is hoped the new model will show, still makes sense.

Technically, the new model is fairly conventional. The engine is in front, the transmission at the rear.

Der Spiegel, the Hamburg news weekly, promptly claimed the 190's chassis was the shape of things to come.

Herr Prinz is not quite so enthusiastic. He feels the 190 is a classical Mercedes which strikes a balance between utility and comfort.

Its aerodynamic rating has been improved to 0.33, falling just short of the 0.3 of the new Audi 100. Herr Prinz says aerodynamics cannot be the sole consideration.

Further streamlining is technically possible but would require intolerable compromises in other departments, he says.

But he is proud of the weight that has been shed. The 190 weighs 1,080kg, or 280kg less than the next model in the Mercedes range.

"That," he says, "is a gigantic step forward for us." The smallest 190 weighs the same as the BM2 323i, the largest model in the comparable BMW range.

But the BMW 323i has a six-cylinder engine.

BMW say it is pure coincidence that their range has been restyled at almost the same time as the Mercedes 190 was unveiled.

"We planned to launch our new models a year later," says BMW's Karlheinz Radermacher, "but stepped up development work to keep pace with US consumer regulations."

The new US regulations have been shelved by the Reagan administration, but the BMW board in Munich decided to launch the new range regardless.

Richard Gaul

(Die Zeit, 10 December 1982)



Is it really needed? Daimler-Benz' new Mercedes, the 190.
(Photo: Mercedes-Benz)

Hovertrain trials enter the crucial last phase

The Bonn Research Ministry has invested more than DM700m in various hovertrain projects since development began in 1968. But doubts are widespread that a commercially run hovertrain will ever run in the Federal Republic of Germany. Much will depend on tests due to start in February on a stretch of track being built between the villages of Lathen and Dörpen in the Emsland region, near the Dutch border.

Trials over the new 20-mile stretch of track marks the end of the programme to test various high-speed hovertrain designs.

The Bonn Research Ministry decided in 1978 in favour of the electromagnetic principle in its quest for a high-speed mass transport system for passengers and high-grade freight.

The hovercraft principle has been dropped. So has the electrodynamic principle. The electromagnetic principle was patented in Germany in 1937.

The power of attraction between electromagnets in the railcar and along the track is computer-set to ensure that the two stay a steady centimetre apart.

The train thus appears to hover on this once-centimetre chink between it and the track.

The railcar supports perch on top of the monorail track. They surround it virtually on all sides, and when the magnets are switched off the car's runners settle on the track.

Power is provided by a linear electric motor that also functions as a brake. The hovertrain can reach top speeds of up to 250mph over long distances.

The system that is first to be put through its paces on the new track will be the Transrapid, designed and built by a consortium headed by Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB).

Preliminary trials will be completed by next October. Further tests will be run by a company whose shareholders include the Bundesbahn and Lufthansa.

Bends and inclines are being built into the track to simulate practical running conditions.

The hovertrain is envisaged as an intercity link or airport access system over distances of up to 60 miles and at speeds of up to 200mph.

It may also be used as an international link between European conurbations, over longer distances and at speeds of up to 250mph.

The experimental track will be 31.5km (about 20 miles). Its first stage is 20.6km (about 13 miles). It runs on prefabricated concrete pylons at intervals of between 20 and 37 metres.

It will comprise a high-speed section and a bend with a radius of 1,690 metres, plus (in the final stage) a narrower loop.

The experimental hovertrain consists of two sections. It is 54 metres long, 3.7 metres wide, 3.9 metres tall and weighs 122 tonnes.

It will run experimentally for a maximum 18 hours a day, regardless of temperature, wind, rain or snow.

Test data will be computer-evaluated and take into acount functioning, safety, reliability, noise, maintenance, servicing and passenger comfort.

The train must accelerate smoothly. The new system of points must be thoroughly tested to ensure there are no sudden jerks.

Points will not cross in the conventional manner; they will bend. It is a complicated system that needs extensive trials.

The first stage of the experimental track is expected to cost DM422m. By the end of this month orders totalling DM25m will have been placed with local firms.

This is extremely important in a depressed area near the Dutch border. The hovertrain project will also, MBB say, emphasise Germany's lead in this mode of transport.

Other countries are also active. Britain, France, Canada, Russia, America and, especially, Japan are working hard on rival projects.

All over the world theoretical and experimental research and practical trials are in progress.

The shape the hovertrain may take will depend on the results of the trials and on the cost of the project.

But none the countries that are working on hovertrain projects want to fall behind and allow others to reap the benefits.

Gerhard Taube

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 28 November 1982)



Does it have a commercial future? MBB's Hovertrain going through its paces.
(Photo: Krauss-Maffei)

THE ENVIRONMENT

Coordinating body tries to resolve differences of protest groups

The BBU, or national coordinating body of environmental protest groups, was launched 10 years ago.

It celebrated the anniversary in such a level-headed, businesslike manner that it seemed happy its teething troubles were over.

The general assembly was held in a canary-yellow comprehensive school in Hanover, a factory-like building that did not lend itself to demonstrations of pride in what had been achieved.

A degree of satisfaction was the most that could be said to have been voiced by the 100 or so delegates.

They were satisfied that the organisation had succeeded in keeping together and emerging as a factor in environmental policy that parliaments and the authorities could no longer ignore.

The BBU office has moved from Karlsruhe to Bonn (and the organisation does not amount to much more than an office). The move testifies to self-confidence.

It is a self-confidence BBU officials have long felt but one that is not shared by many protest groups affiliated to it.

They still sense the contradiction between a spontaneous, local and one-off protest group and a central organisation, no matter how loosely organised it might be.

They are worried that people at the



top might lose contact with the grass roots, the rank and file.

But after 10 years of work there is a growing realisation that both local activities and countrywide campaigns are needed.

As one delegate put it, it was high time the organisation abandoned short trousers and donned its first suit and the change brooked no further delay.

The BBU was keen to establish a wide-ranging alliance of all extra-parliamentary forces. It had long abandoned the narrowly-based platform of an anti-nuclear power movement.

In its progress toward what Jo Leinen, spokesman for the executive committee, called an ecological and alternative movement the BBU increasingly reflected the public debate.

The debate on the future of industrial society had only just begun in earnest.

All constituent groups will not choose to follow the BBU in this direction, but there have always been groups that resigned membership and others that took their place.

The BBU has never led from above; it has never been more than a letter-box or central information service for individual groups, and the groups have taken care to ensure that was how it remained.

That is why there is little point in wondering how many members the BBU unites. It has access to about 1,050 groups with a combined membership of roughly 300,000, but it cannot mobilise them.

What individual groups do is entirely for them to decide, and they are keen to retain their independence.

By no means all environmental groups are affiliated to the BBU. More are affiliated to it in the south, less in the north of the country.

The protest groups are legitimate political offspring of the Social and Free Democratic coalition in keeping with Willy Brandt's promise to "risk more democracy."

But they have chosen to aim at a somewhat different, more grass-root democratic interpretation by which greater importance is attached to group independence than to the weight carried by a large organisation.

Where a specific objective is at stake, such as an autobahn, a chemicals factory or a kindergarten that is needed, this independent status makes sense.

But major, supraregional issues, from atmospheric pollution to waste of ground water, call for organised activity at state or national level.

This need runs counter to the origins of the protest group movement, which began as a spontaneous reaction by individuals personally affected.

The anniversary conference dealt, against this background, with three issues: topics, the crisis in connection with forms of activity and the question: "What has been accomplished?"

There can be no doubt that classical environmental issues will continue to be dealt with, but they alone are no longer enough.

Experts needed

"Acid rainfall is an environmental hazard that actually exists, but what about genetic engineering, the potential hazards of which can but be imagined (albeit without much difficulty)?

The protest movement can no longer manage without expert opinion and specialists, and the gap between those who are conversant with the facts and those who carry out the groups' activities grows ever wider.

Has the demonstration as the major form of activity outlived its usefulness? A majority felt it had not, but was aware of the problems that arose from the participation of "autonomous groups."

These are groups that are prepared to use violence, whereas the BBU strictly insists on non-violence. When and where is the line to be drawn?

Do new forms of non-violent action exist that might have a wider public appeal?

About 1,800 demonstrators against the new runway at Frankfurt airport look like facing criminal proceedings that could easily lead to suit for damages or payment of the cost of sending in the police.

Ought the BBU to keep its views self on this risk of the right to de trate being undermined by govern cash demands? Or should it see its a civil rights movement?

"In 10 years we have made p conscious of the environm chaos," said Inge Ammon, who w elected to the executive committee.

"But in future," she added, "we not just accuse; we must outline fic solutions."

True enough, environmental a ness has been heightened. So, enough, has the uneasy conscienc ecological offenders.

But the BBU has failed to achi breakthrough to a generally acc ecological viewpoint.

It has no desire to have dealings political parties, preferring to steer of them. This even applies to Greens, although a benevolent vie them is taken.

Many Greens come from the ran protest groups and even from the itself, but the BBU would prefer n be identified with the Greens.

The Greens, after all, are felt n have accomplished everything they p mised. Some BBU members are alr saying they feel themselves to be a rective to the Greens.

This they owe to their status as a violent, non-partisan, extra-parlia tary movement.

This definition betrays uncerta and the change of power in Bonn p only a minor part.

Nearly everyone in the move says a colder wind is now blow Some are firmly convinced the C tian and Free Democratic coalitio determined to impose legal restrai the BBU.

In point of fact, however, the p groups are suffering from the c quences of their own success.

The BBU has grown so large an fluential, indeed popular, that it un fortably senses an obligation to ac even more.

It feels duty bound to be even successful and not to disappoi members.

But no-one yet knows how to d without becoming a lobby or a p political auxiliary and without fo ing the character of the movement.

The BBU is so at a loss as to whe go from here that it no longer proud of what it has accomplished.

Several million ordinary people engaged in practical politics as m bers of protest groups.

Many preferred as a result not to established political parties but more, especially young people, an alternative to resignation and ference.

In criticising shortcomings of the tem they have stabilised the syste point they are not so happy to hear.

But their influence on the partie remained disappointingly slight, w is why some BBU members are ke the idea of functioning as a Bonn ronmental lobby.

All this is to be discussed next y a strategy conference. The BBU long progressed from environm conservation to ecology and politic

It deals with missile modernis the peace movement, upholding an fending democratic rights, soli with the victims of Bonn spending be they students or tenants, and structures in the economy and soci

Outsiders are less in doubt members that it will succeed in co to terms with the change.

Horst Bie

(Die Zeit, 3 December

THE ARTS

De Chirico: a longing for unknown horizons

Frankfurter Allgemeine

d Einstein's pithy, aphoristic scription of the painter Giorgio irico, 1888-1978, remains unbeat ll but forgotten:

s lives between Florence and the Metro and meditates, with a touch hopenhauer, between Paracelsus ntreamont."

combination of tradition and mo y and the abrupt encroachment of ryday, so abrupt that it cut out etaphorical level of comparison, ild, antiquarian educational level hook effect.

se were the characteristic features Chirico's paintings, features that d to set them aside from compari f time.

metaphysical painting featured te objects in startling perspective as a living configuration of longing elancholy.

ansposed romantic dissatisfaction eality into a poetry of latent hor-

ollinaire supported de Chirico, as then an outsider, in Paris from to 1914. He appreciated his dis , breathtakingly still paintings.

ollinaire felt they bore out his new tic category, surprise. A little later were hailed by the surrealists as ne enlightenment."

t for nothing did they describe first encounter with the paintings Chirico, an Italian who grew up in e, as an initiation rite.

y felt it opened their eyes for the rful or, as Aragon succinctly put C'est la contradiction qui apparaît le réel."

surrealists programmatically put Chirico on a pedestal, and that was Max Ernst, referring both to his gs and to his role as a precursor, yed him.

, too, was how he was portrayed group photos of the magazine *La lution Surréaliste*.

e surrealists were later to react just ckingly to de Chirico's betrayal, as aw it, of his early work.

s flight into art history, his return ftsmanship, beginning in Rome in and his essay in *Valori plastici* oning traditionalist art within the work of the Novecento group, led ally to Breton's excommunica f him.

de Chirico, thus declared dead as ter, it was a traumatic experience hich he sought compensation by g himself a classical artist and by nt hate-filled tirades against mo y.

ere would be little point in outlin is conflict again had it not assum ensions in art history.

major Munich exhibition, com over 90 paintings and 100 draw by de Chirico, provides striking ples.

ke the New York version in the um of Modern Art, which by con ing on metaphysical painting ned the surrealists' verdict, the ch exhibition tries to upgrade his work.

But it is a half-hearted attempt that carries little conceptual conviction, and for some inexplicable reason 1935 is taken as a turning point.

The full rooms hung with his metaphysical painting are followed by an eclectic and scaled-down appendix that can hardly be said to succeed in even posing the crucial question.

Historically, the crucial question is that of the relationship between continuity and de Chirico's break with his past.

The Nietzsche quotations listed in the catalogue and the abundance of facts and individually illuminating iconographical analyses are not much help either.

They run a risk of making de Chirico's paintings appear nothing but riddles, unless, that is, one is prepared to accept an interpretation that is a hopeless mess even in historical terms.

In this connection light is shed solely by Christian Derouet's brilliant and well-founded work on de Chirico's neo-Baroque gladiator series.

This is even though it evidently runs counter to other writers by implicitly confirming Rubin's view, and Rubin's spirited plea for prime importance to be attached to de Chirico's early work is determinedly and convincingly seen in the context of modernity.

Yet the gradiose series of portraits at the Munich exhibition shows that de Chirico, while styling himself with increasing insistence and virtuoso painting a tragic seer and thinker and a monumental figure, retained a vivid capacity at least as a painter of pathetic gestures.

His love of riddles, here conjured in inscriptions, all too often ends in empty rhetoric. Where de Chirico earlier allowed what Breton called the *objet-fantôme* to speak, the riddle remains solely in capital letters. In his metaphysical painting the ambivalence of petrification and life, expressing a conflict situation specific to the era, shows how the painter's ego has grown alien to him, along with the world. It features wide and empty squares lined by arcades in deep shadow and by walls that time and again hide what is behind them from view. On them monuments and tiny schematic humans, toy-like train shapes and clocks convey the effect of hermetic ciphers from an inner world projected outwardly. Like his tailor's dummies, manikins and, as it were, physiognomically throttled masks, they are images of a mainly objectivised world. The emotional overvaluation of distorted objects that appear condensed and split up at one and the same time, as in a dream, is the result of a melancholy view. De Chirico, in his own words, was possessed by a longing for unknown horizons.



De Chirico's 'Le muse inquietanti', 1917.

The melancholy disposition has long included a love of geometry, and this love is ever-present in de Chirico's paintings.

It is literally embodied in his metaphysical interiors with their unstably interspersed angles.

What with irritatingly interspersed sticks of sugar candy, plaited confectionery and geographical maps, they convert the studio picture of old into a mysterious still life.

Where pictures of disused factories are included, quotation-like, the anachronistic role of art in an industrial society is also described.

Where the gods are dead, art becomes the refuge of metaphysics.

De Chirico's imagination is fired by the seemingly emblematic symbols of advertising, unexpectedly ranked alongside antique busts of Apollo to mark a break between the ancient world and the present.

As objects stand still, historic discontinuity seems to part company with time altogether.

De Chirico's longing is for the lost world of ancient art and mythology. It keeps alive a painful recollection of childhood.

One is reminded of Freud's psychoanalytical interpretations of ancient myths and Aby Warburg's interpretation of antiquity.

The broken topicalisation of antiquity, reminiscent of Arnold Böcklin and Max Klinger, stands in tension with the everyday world of objects.

At the time, de Chirico withstood the tension, forestalling a backward-looking romantic empathy with the past.

De Chirico ends by drawing a conclusion from a conflict that came to a head in the 19th century, being strikingly put by Karl Marx, who asked:



De Chirico: self portrait, 1919.

(Photos: Catalogue)

"Where is Vulcan in comparison with Robert & Co., Jupiter in comparison with the lightning conductor and Hermes in comparison with the Crédit mobilier?

"Is Achilles possible alongside powder and lead? Would the Iliad be conceivable alongside the printing press and printing machinery?

"Do singing, sagas and the muse not necessarily end with the age of print, with the end of essential prerequisites of epic poetry?"

From this anachronistic relationship noted by Marx, de Chirico develops his new poetry, although he would have been unlikely to arrive at a style of his own had it not been for his encounter with the Paris avant-garde.

His Chinese puzzle with perspective recreating the spatial illusion of the Renaissance, only to dash it by abruptly combining several vanishing points, would have been inconceivable without the schooling provided by Cubism.

So, as Soby and Rubin have shown, would his decision to dispense with uniform lighting and corresponding body modelling.

But where the Cubists aimed at a reflection on modes of portrayal and sought to demonstrate the difference between fact and fiction of painting, what de Chirico aims at is a mode of expression.

The staggering irrationality of his rooms, vanishing into the background and then suddenly turning, serves to make matters mysterious and seem bereft of location and gravity.

De Chirico's pictorial world lacks stability. Scales are broken and shadows live lives of their own, like Peter Schlemihl's in Chamisso's Romantic novella.

Even colours are seen in identical contrast near and far; starkly contrasting directions of movement block each other as in a trauma.

De Chirico turns into a motif of paralysis, what the futurists were to see as the quintessence of a new aesthetics, the celebration of speed and technology.

His locomotives and ships may gather steam but they are also rigidly immobile. In this perspectivisation of anxiety de Chirico reflects the shadow of the First World War.

Monika Steinhauser

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 December 1982)

De Chirico catalogue is available from Prestel Verlag, Munich.

SOCIETY

Persistent alcoholism given as reason for not legalising soft drugs

Drugs such as cannabis and LSD are not quite as popular as they were in the 1970s, a Munich conference has been told.

But socially acceptable addictions, such as alcohol caused as many problems as ever. There was, therefore, no case for easing restrictions on soft drugs.

Christiane F., now a budding pop singer, is no longer the 15-year-old cover girl most Germans associated with heroin addiction a few years ago.

Her tale, that of a West Berlin addict in her early teens who, unlike many of her friends, kicked the habit, was serialised in *Stern* magazine.

It sold well as a book and the film version of *Wir Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo* (We Children of Zoo Station) was also seen by many.

Christiane F.'s name was a household word that has now almost been forgotten. It is just as well: it will never be known how many young people her tale must have encouraged to follow in her junkie footsteps.

It would be best if magazines which claim to feature such stories for educational purposes were to steer clear of, say, the glue-sniffers of Berlin or Cologne.

They would again be to blame for popularising drug addiction to epidemic proportions.

Drugs are an unsolved problem that cannot simply be reduced to spectacular instances of institutional failure such as lay behind the dead Frankfurt fixer whose tale was recently told on an TV current affairs programme.

The problem cannot be limited to drugs generally accepted as narcotics in society today, to hallucinogens such as LSD, cannabis, cocaine and the opiates.

Branding them as illegal merely made it easier to take others less seriously, lawyer Arthur Kreuzer told the 34th annual conference of the German Social Paediatrical Association in Munich.

Alcohol was one such alternative that needed to be taken seriously, both because its use was so widespread and because of the effect it had on individuals and society.

Criminal activity in connection with alcohol was, he estimated, more widespread than crime in connection with narcotics.


Educationally the distinction in law between cannabis and alcohol made no sense, but that was not to be taken as a plea for easing restrictions on "soft" drugs.

"We already have a whole range of difficulties with alcohol to deal with," said pharmacologist Wolfgang Forth. There was no need of yet another narcotic to be socially integrated.

Instead of debating whether cannabis ought to be made more freely available we ought to be wondering whether "we have nothing better to offer young people than the freedom to indulge in unreal dreams in a state of intoxication."

The drug scene has eased off a little, international statistics show. This impression was borne out by a number of papers at the Munich interdisciplinary conference.

Hashish consumption has declined in comparison with the 1970s in Germany, which cannot be said of heroin or co-



caine, the fashionable drug preferred by the creative upper class.

A trend has been apparent for the past three years in the United States too. There has been a slight decline in hashish and opiate consumption.

Heroin consumption has likewise declined slightly lately in the US. There also has been a substantial drop in the market for LSD and angel's dust.

And there is a change in the reasons given for drug consumption. US youngsters used to share a joint to get high; now they claim to take drugs to boost performance.

There is a corresponding increase in the taking of tablets and pills, a habit particularly widespread among women.

The trend is borne out by 1973, 1976 and 1980 polls of Bavarian youngsters aged 12 to 24.

The Bavarian polls take into account the No. 1 drug, alcohol. An estimated 8.7 per cent of Bavarian youngsters are potential or actual alcoholics.

In the 1980 poll 11 per cent of the young people questioned said they had taken drugs; in the previous poll their number was 12 per cent.

In all three polls two out of three takers merely tried narcotics out. In this category, numbers have declined, whereas regular users have remained steady at between four and five per cent.

There has been a steady decline in both categories among 12- to 17-year-olds. Among 17- to 24-year-olds the number of consumers in either category has stayed at a steady 18 per cent.

Young people are definitely older than they used to be when they smoke their first joint. In 1980 they were 17 on average; in 1976 they were 15.

Among regular users the trend is even more marked. In 1976 46 per cent of addicts were 18-20 years old and 27 per cent 21-24.

In 1980 41 per cent were 21-24 years old and 33 per cent 18-20.

The drug most frequently taken is hashish, which in the Bavarian polls is listed alongside LSD, mescalin and other hallucinogens.

Its popularity increased from two thirds in 1973 to nearly three quarters in 1980, compared with a decline in the consumption frequency of other narcotics. The figures for these were five per cent for opiates, mainly heroin, in 1980, 11 per cent for stimulants, four per cent for sniffing and an unspecified but definite decline in consumption of LSD and mescalin.

Cocaine abuse is on the increase, from two per cent in 1973 to four per cent in 1980, while in terms of drug consumers as a whole the comparison is even more striking.

Cocaine was taken by seven per cent of youngsters who had tried out narcotics in 1980 and by 13 per cent of regular users, the figures for 1973 being three and seven per cent.

Hashish undeniably continues to be the drug most people first try, although only five per cent of people who have ever given it a try end up as heroin addicts.

Yet most of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 heroin addicts in the Federal Republic of Germany began their narcotics careers with hashish, said Cologne sociologist Karl-Heinz Reuband.

So there is not an automatic progression from the joint to the fix, especially as cannabis is not habit-forming in the sense of creating a physical addiction.

That is more than can be said for barbiturates, painkillers, heroin and alcohol, and even among heroin addicts there are cases or people voluntarily kicking the habit, as Arthur Kreuzer pointed out.

He felt pacemaker theories of all kinds were naive. By no means all juvenile shoplifters went on to become fully-fledged criminals.

Many young people who give drugs a try give them up because they get nothing from them. Such expectations and disappointments were as much part of a drug career as social background, Herr Reuband said.

Progress or access to drugs could only be understood in the context of young people's social contacts.

Those who were sociable and had friends stood a greater chance of coming into contact with drugs. But it would be wrong simply to refer to young people being led astray.

Progress was determined by curiosity typical of the young, by the desire to gain personal experience even though the risk (of, say, heroin) was well known.

They also were impressed by and large by the drug scene, felt emotional ties with what was a peer group were introduced to narcotics by fri

This was the usual way in which cess to drugs was gained; it deter the further progress of young peop ward addiction.

Drug taking is behaviour that m learnt. To this day it remains, as hygiene expert M. Franke put it, a pression of social protest.

It might, Herr Kreuzer said, be cursor of psychosocial deviation, was not problems, subjectively that paved the way into the drug Herr Reuband added.

What made it so attractive was tive experience of the scene. As Kreuzer put it: "The dealer is felt a friend, not a murderer."

Young people may be less incline attribute drug taking to personal lems, but these problems objec exist.

Drugs were taken, H. Solms said, to give satisfaction but to avoid dis faction.

Outlining a psychoanalytical nation of addiction, he said it was tempt at self-treatment, albeit one was doomed to failure, on the pa of the immature personality.

The clash between a weak ego with the libido, and a tyrannical ego was externalised and transferr certain aspects of society that were tacked as being authoritarian.

This was inwardly denied, and demands of the superego were pr ted on to the "others," thereby pr ing penalisation from outside.

The addict fought on two fronts: against himself and against the world. He constantly wavered bet rebellion and clinging on to others.

Therapeutic treatment of ad must bear this in mind. An addicti the lurch will seek via drugs the nal kindliness he felt unable to himself for fear of being overwhel by his own emotions.

Treatment must attempt to make positive experience of the drug superfluous by virtue of positive tional experience in the therapy gro

It must entail progress toward rity for young people with psycho cits resulting from a disturbed pa child interface.

Parents must thus inevitably be ded in the therapy, and this was for by more than one speaker at the ference.

But nothing was said by paren drug addicts, and no reports were by therapists on practical experien group work.

Therapeutic treatment of addic no longer felt as it was a few years to be a waste of time.

Psychologist Lieselotte Franger that 19 of 30 young addicts who fallen foul of the law and been tre at Parsberg, a closed hospital ria, had now broken with the habit.

D. Ladewig outlined findings of aftercare in Basle, Switzerland. He addicts reviewed had broken off ment, but 80 per cent of those lasted the distance, 18 months in a rapeutic community, either kicked drug habit or managed to run their lives.

It was, he said, a four-stage pro consisting of decontamination, brea the habit, rehabilitation and after The crucial feature was to give addi sense of self-assurance. Genuine est must be shown in the individual.

The emphasis by doctors, psych gists, educationalists and parents be on help, not penalisation.

Elisabeth Bauschmid
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 December 1982)

More people are leaving the bottle alone, says report

More Germans are tending to drink less or not at all, according to a government survey: nine per cent of men and 29 per cent of women, compared with seven per cent and 20 per cent in a similar survey in 1973.

But the same proportion of the population drink alcohol every day or almost every day (55 per cent of men and 20 per cent of women) as in 1973 and 1978.

A curious finding: the highest proportion of regular drinkers is in villages of fewer than 2,000 people. Yet the addiction rate is highest in cities and reduces with the size of the community.

The survey was issued by Irmgard Karwatzki, state secretary to the Bonn Youth, Family Affairs and Health Ministry, in reply to a parliamentary question by Christian Democrat Werner Dollata.


Since 1978, however, the number of potential alcoholics has declined. New 14 per cent of men and five per cent of women are felt to be potential alcoholics.

The highest proportion of regular

Continued on page 15

STATE SECURITY

Tank armour secret to all but Moscow



secret weakness of the Leopard I k was no secret to the Russians fore it began coming off the as y lines in 1979.

tank's armour was faulty because ed makers had decided against g it through a special strengthen cess.

ails of the Leopard II armour was ssed on to the Russians.

e story of the affair has come t through the trial of a man d with spying for the Soviet , Dietrich Manfred Liebert, 47.

ert is said to have worked for the s from 1967, but for much of the s what is known in the espiona as a sleeper.

eeper is a highly trained spy who s inactive until he is needed. He ccasional training courses, but is d not to arouse suspicion. He not be on any counter-intelli files.

typical sleeper has two duties: ing to the East Bloc once a year ther training; and periodically his transmitter. Liebert's radio cked in an asbestos box and bu a small forest, the court heard.

ert has admitted that in 1972 he is controllers that the Leopard to fall apart even without enemy

welding seams tended to come s soon as the going became a bit he told the Russians. He had got formation from friends employed e steelmaker, Heinrichshütte, a n subsidiary near Bonn.

played poker with them regularly local pub and they told him all the tank. Soon the Russians knew bout the type of steel used, its ss, tensile strength and the pro n methods.

er they were to get examples, also ed through the poker-in-the-pub ts, of the armour used in the Leo II, one of the top products of the n arms industry.

1971, said the steelworkers, they allen behind in the production of plating for the Marder and what hen the Leopard I.

company would have to pay heavy penalties for late delivery, so they agreed among themselves to skip the "glow process" in which the plating is heated to 800 deg. C and exposed to it for 60 hours. This adds tensile strength. Believing that "the Bundeswehr is too stupid to notice anything," they sandblasted the plating as it was and released it for assembly. The incident became known and a lot of people were fired, said Liebert, who then was a metalworker.

The Russians then told him to study mechanical engineering. Liebert, then 31, did exactly that, on a German government student allowance. He graduated, having specialised in material testing.

Everything worked like a charm, and when he needed steel samples — allegedly in connection with his studies — his card-playing friends were happy to oblige with discarded bits of the latest batch of armour plating.

He buried the samples in prearranged places where they were picked up by Soviet couriers and rushed to Moscow.

The head of personnel at one of the Thyssen companies, testifying as a witness, explained to the court how Liebert was able to obtain the samples: one of his friends was a material and welding seam tester who marked pieces that passed the quality test with a chalk mark. He was able to pass scrap samples on to Liebert.

The friendship between the two continued after Liebert graduated with a diploma as a mechanical engineer.

Now he could no longer say that he needed the samples for his studies; so he said he was working for an engineering firm that was developing steel for tank armour and was hoping to arrange a big deal.

He asked his friends to help out with steel samples — especially the new HZB 20 and HZB 301 types. This is the steel used for the Leopard II's turrets and fronts, the most vulnerable parts of a tank. His friends were again happy to oblige.

In retrospect, it seems doubtful whether the Soviet spymasters were well advised to activate their sleeper.


Liebert admitted in court that the hectic life of an active spy was rather tiring and that he had grown sick of it after a few years.


Interior Minister Gerhart Baum called on foreign agents to turn themselves in, promising them more lenient sentences if they did so.

Liebert's initial idea was to make some money out of his 14-year career as a spy by selling his story to a major illustrated magazine and a tabloid. But neither was prepared to pay the DM100,000 he wanted his memoirs.

In 1981, he turned himself in to German counter intelligence. The story he told them seemed unbelievable at first. The officers who interrogated him found it hard to grasp that it could be so easy to breach the secret of the Leopard II, the Bundeswehr's pride and joy.

Hasso Ziegler
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 27 November 1982)





Defrocked: the Leopard II tank. (Photo: Werek)

Continued from page 14

ers is in villages of less than 2,000

ities with a population of over 1.5 n, Frau Karwatzki said, eight per of people were addicts. This figure ed as communities grew smaller. villages of 2,000 to 5,000 people were, on average, only two and a er cent addicts.

lier polls had shown that one per of secondary school graduates, per cent of students with university ce qualifications and five per of university students took drugs. ng people virtually failed to fi in official statistics on misuse of nes.

ddp
(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 3 December 1982)

Beware of East Berlin agents, industrialists warned

Industrialists in the Federal Republic have been warned to be on their guard against industrial spies from East Germany.

The Chief Federal Prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, told a meeting in Bad Dürkheim that about 20 per cent of East Germany's espionage in the Federal Republic involved commerce.

He said that sometimes GDR industrial buyers demanded detailed information about production methods. This was a common East German ploy.

Rebmann said that there are between 1,500 and 2,500 GDR agents in the Federal Republic. About 50 are caught each year by counter-intelligence.

Their tasks vary. Some collect political and economic information — as in the case of former Chancellor Willy Brandt's personal assistant Günter Guillaume who provided the GDR leadership with top secret inside information.

Others collect industrial secrets, and save the GDR an estimated DM300m a year in research costs.

The recruiting approach for West Germans to spy for the GDR is always the same: they are either accosted during visits to East Germany or are recruited through advertisements of seemingly innocuous companies.

Secretaries, who are usually rather productive sources of information, are approached by male recruiters pretending to be in love with them.



Kurt Rebmann ... watch the secretary's boyfriend. (Photo: dpa)

Despite the GDR's massive spying activities in the Federal Republic, Chief Federal Prosecutor Rebmann's main concern is still terrorism.

Though the danger from terrorism has lessened since 1977, he told the industrialists that it would remain a danger as long as certain groupings re-

Allgemeine Zeitung

sorted to violence in pursuit of their political goals.


Independent terrorist groupings were increasingly prepared to undermine the authority of the judiciary and executive branch and thus also undermine democracy.

Rebmann, whose predecessor was killed by terrorists in 1977, said that we must learn from the 1920s and 1930s and check any development that could lead to violence and anarchy.

He appealed to Western countries to cooperate in the search for German terrorists. He regretted the lack of cooperation from some Middle East countries where terrorists are provided with a haven and training.


Germany must still expect terrorist attacks on people who are considered to symbolise society. The revolutionary cells were growing increasingly dangerous and the Red Army Faction (RAF) still enjoyed support.


Günther Leicher
(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 2 December 1982)




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